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Abstract
Consistent with facts for a cross-section of OECD countries, I document that the labor force
participation rate of West German mothers with children aged zero to two exceeds the corre-
sponding child care enrollment rate whereas the opposite is true for mothers with children aged
three to mandatory school age. I develop a life-cycle model that explicitly accounts for this age-
dependent relationship through various types of non-paid and paid child care. The calibrated
version of the model is used to evaluate two policy reforms concerning the supply of subsidized
child care for children aged zero to two. These counterfactual policy experiments suggest that
the lack of subsidized child care constitutes indeed for some females a barrier to participate in
the labor market and depresses fertility.
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1 Introduction
At the Barcelona meeting in March 2002, the European Council recommended that its member
states remove “barriers and disincentives for female labor force participation by, inter alia, improv-
ing the provision of child care facilities”, European Council (2002). Even quantitative targets for
the level of provision were set. By 2010, the EU member states shall provide child care for 33% of all
children younger than age three and for 90% of all children aged three to mandatory school age. In
2008, the German government passed a law that aims at implementing the target value for children
younger than age three. The German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women
and Youth further motivated this target value by recognizing that for women “good conditions
for the compatibility of family and working life are a prerequisite to fulfill their desired fertility
level” and by “the exemplary standards in Western and Northern European countries, for which
a relationship between child care enrollment, maternal employment and fertility is observed”, see
Sharma and Steiner (2008). Governments may provide child care and promote female labor force
participation and fertility for several reasons, e.g. investment in children’s human capital, gender
equality or to alleviate the economic consequences of the demographic change for the labor market
and social security system. In this paper I am after a more basic question, namely to quantify
in how far (not) providing child care constitutes a barrier or disincentive for female labor force
participation and fertility choices.
Figure 1 shows for a cross-section of EU countries (those which are also in the OECD) the signif-
icant positive correlation of the fraction of children aged zero to two enrolled in a paid child care
arrangement, e.g. in form of a daycare center or a nanny, with the labor force participation rate of
mothers with children aged zero to two and the total fertility rate.1 Clearly, these correlations do
not necessarily reflect causality and (due to data availability) only display the actual enrollment
rates and not the provision rates of child care. Hence, with regard to the main question asked
in this paper these figures do not permit to draw conclusions on how far (not) providing child
care constitutes a barrier or disincentive for female labor force participation and fertility choices.
Moreover, the relationships crucially hinge on the age of the children. For children aged three to
five the previously significant positive correlations become negative or much weaker and are no
longer statistically significant, see Figure 2. This suggests a very different role of child care for
maternal labor force participation decisions in the two age groups. In this context, Figures 1 and 2
reveal another important relationship. The labor force participation rate of mothers with children
aged zero to two exceeds the corresponding child care enrollment rate on average by 29 percentage
points. To the contrary, for mothers with children aged three to five the child care enrollment
rate exceeds the maternal labor force participation rate on average by 19 percentage points. Put
differently, paid child care is used heavily by non-working mothers (of children between age three
and five) whereas a substantial fraction of mothers (of children below age three) works without
using any paid child care. This gap cannot be explained by the usage of nannies or alike as those
arrangements are already included in paid child care enrollment. Note that this also holds in the
1The exact definition of child care enrollment in OECD (2007) for children aged zero comprises formal child care
arrangements such as group care in child care centers, registered child minders based in their homes looking after one
or more children, and care provided by a carer at the home of the child. For children aged three to five enrollment
rates concern formal pre-school services including daycare facilities and in some countries primary schooling. The
information in OECD (2007) only refers to the extensive margin of maternal labor force participation and paid child
care enrollment. In the subsequent analysis I also consider the intensive margin.
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Figure 1: Child Care Enrollment of Children Aged 0 to 2 in the EU
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Figure 2: Child Care Enrollment of Children Aged 3 to 5 in the EU
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US and Canada: 18.5 and 39.7 percentage points, respectively, more of the mothers with children
aged zero to two are working than using paid child care, see OECD (2007).
The observation that unpaid child care is a common choice has already been acknowledged in one of
the earliest economic studies of child care by Heckman (1974) but has been ignored in many recent
analyses. Blau and Currie (2006) summarize the results for a wide range of studies for the US (Table
5 in there) which employ static discrete choice models to investigate the interaction between child
care and maternal labor force participation. Among those only three, Ribar (1995), Blau and Hagy
(1998), and Tekin (2007) include non-paid, non-maternal child care as choice. However, Blau (2003)
shows that the assumption that paid care is always the relevant non-maternal child care option leads
to inconsistent parameter estimates which as a consequence impacts the result of any counterfactual
policy analysis. Recent dynamic models on female labor supply with a focus on paid child care,
e.g. Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008), Domeij and Klein (2010), Fehr and Ujhelyiova
(2010), and Haan and Wrohlich (2011), are as well prone to this critique as all assume that each
hour of maternal work requires one hour of paid child care.
The first contribution of this paper is to introduce non-paid, non-maternal child care into a dynamic
setting which features returns to experience. Second, by distinguishing paid child care between
publicly (subsidized) and market (non-subsidized) provided arrangements the setup allows me to
address the policy question asked at the beginning, namely in how far governments can influence
maternal labor force participation by increasing the provision of child care. Finally, this question
is extended to fertility by making it as well a choice variable.2
The analysis is undertaken with a quantitative, dynamic life-cycle model which is calibrated to a
sample of West German married females.3 West Germany constitutes an ideal candidate for the
following reasons. First, in terms of data availability, the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is
the only European household panel with continuous information on paid child care usage along the
extensive and intensive (part- vs. full-time) margin. Moreover, the characteristics of the German
child care market permit to infer from the GSOEP whether a child attends publicly (subsidized) or
market (non-subsidized) provided child care. In addition, the number of subsidized child care slots
per hundred children is available from the German Statistical Office. Second, the low maternal
labor force participation, child care enrollment and fertility rates in Germany are representative
for Continental Europe (with the exception of France and BeNeLux), such that the results from
counterfactual policy experiments should be of interest to other Continental European countries.
The paper contributes to the literature that uses dynamic life-cycle models to evaluate family poli-
cies, as e.g. in Guner and Knowles (2009) and Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2010), by evaluating
2Fehr and Ujhelyiova (2010), and Haan and Wrohlich (2011) also endogenize fertility but, as already noted, ignore
the option of non-paid, non-maternal child care. Del Boca (2002), and Del Boca and Sauer (2009) constitute a
special case. They investigate the impact of child care provision as an “economy-wide factor” on fertility and
maternal labor force participation without modeling child care as a choice or as a requirement for working mothers.
Blau and Robins (1989), Blau and Robins (1991) for the US, Kravdal (1996) for Norway and Hank and Kreyenfeld
(2003) for Germany conduct a reduced form analysis of the role of child care for fertility and partly maternal labor
force participation. Lehrer and Kawasaki (1985) and Mason and Kuhlthau (1992) investigate in how fare child care
affects birth intensions.
3I restrict the analysis to West Germany since, originating from the pre-reunification period, maternal labor
force participation and child care enrollment rates differ even today strongly between West and East Germany. In
a companion paper Bick (2011) I document these differences in detail and analyze them with the model presented
here.
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a reform that aims at implementing the target for the provision of child care for children aged
zero to two set by the European Council at the 2002 Barcelona meeting. Under this reform all
working females are granted access to subsidized child care. Such a reform has been implemented
in Germany in October 2010. According to my results the lack of subsidized child care constitutes
indeed for some females a barrier to participate in the labor market and depresses fertility. The
predicted increase of the labor force participation rate is 23% (7.4 percentage points) for moth-
ers with children aged zero to two. This response is very close to the empirically estimates by
Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) for the late 1990s in Que-
bec after the introduction of a similar policy. Moreover, the implied price elasticity of maternal
labor force participation with respect to paid child care is exactly in the range of estimates listed
in Blau and Currie (2006) for the models that feature as well a non-paid, non-maternal child care
choice, whereas models that require each hour of maternal labor supply to be backed by one hour
of paid child care are associated with much higher price elasticities (in absolute terms). The child
care enrollment rate under the new policy is 41% and thus “overshoots” the targeted level of 33%
while the effect on fertility is only modest, plus 3% or 0.05 children per female. Despite this small
reaction, it is important to endogenize fertility as the aggregate effects on female labor supply are
otherwise significantly overestimated and as a consequence the costs of the reform underestimated.
I consider a further reform which is a natural extension of the previous reform and grants access to
subsidized part-time child care for all children aged zero to two, i.e. unconditional on the maternal
labor force status. This reform results in a higher child care enrollment rate but has neither an
impact on maternal labor force participation nor on fertility relative to the first reform. Hence,
only females that are constrained in their labor force participation choice by the lack of subsidized
child care are also constrained in their fertility choice.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I describe the data set, and how the sample
is selected and constructed. Section 3 documents facts about maternal labor force participation,
child care usage and the supply of subsidized child care in West Germany. I introduce the model
in Section 4, discuss the calibration in Section 5 and the model evaluation in Section 6. Section 7
presents the results from a set of counterfactual policy experiments and Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), an annual
household panel comparable in scope to the American PSID.4 The GSOEP provides all information
required for the pursued question, i.e. female cohabitation, labor force participation and birth
histories, child care enrollment choices, paid child care fees, and income. In particular, it is the
only European household panel with information on paid child care usage along the extensive and
intensive (part- vs. full-time) margin over the entire sample period.5 The data are drawn from the
first wave in 1984 through 2007 spanning the years 1983 to 2006 since the variables on labor force
participation and income refer to the year prior to each interview.
4A detailed description of the GSOEP can be found in Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
5The European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) also has detailed information on child
care usage but started only in 2004.
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Figure 3: A Child’s Life from Birth to Adulthood
Pre-school School
Age
Period
0 3 6.5 9.5 12.5 15.5 18.5
1 2 3 4 5 6
Following the common practice in the literature on female labor supply and fertility, only females
living in a continuous relationship (marriage or cohabitation) with the same partner are included
in the sample.6 I include only the most recent relationship but require that it is still intact at the
last interview and that all children (if present) are from the current partner. The analysis focuses
entirely on West German females and consequently only females that lived there throughout the
whole observation period are considered. Finally, given a trade-off between sample size and poten-
tial cohort effects females born between 1955 and 1975 are included. The number of individuals
satisfying the respective selection criteria are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
Maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment choices by the children’s age constitute
the core of the analysis in this paper. Similarly to Apps and Rees (2005), my focus is however not
on the maternal labor force participation status in each month of a child’s life but during the
different stages of a child’s adolescence. For pre-school ages I follow the usual convention and split
them up in two periods, ages zero to two and ages three to mandatory school age where children
in Germany are on average six and a half years old. To keep the periods at a similar length,
the subsequent age brackets cover three years until adulthood is reached. Figure 3 summarizes
this mapping. Table 1 presents the final number of observations for each period grouped by the
current number of children, e.g. the sample contains 458 females with currently two children and
the youngest child being younger than three. Given the low number of observations for females
with currently four and more children, the analysis on maternal labor force participation and child
care enrollment in this paper focuses on females with one to three children only.
For each period the female labor supply is constructed similar to Francesconi (2002): I assign 0 to
each month in which the female does not work, 0.5 to each month in which she works part-time and
1 to each month in which she works full-time.7 The period labor force participation status is then
defined by the mean over all months. Period means below 0.25 correspond to not working, between
0.25 and 0.75 to part-time working, and above 0.75 to full-time working. As an implication, a female
working part-time in each month of a period and one not working in the first half of a period but
full-time in the second half have the same period labor force participation status, namely part-time
working. In line with the objective of this paper this definition reflects how much a female has
worked in total during certain stages of her children’s adolescence.
6The implied selection bias of focussing on this group of females may go in opposite directions. For example,
the unobservables that produce long-term relationships could make women more desirable in the labor market (e.g.,
good communication and conflict management skills) but could also reflect preferences for non-market activities as
household production. A more detailed discussion can be found in Francesconi (2002).
7The monthly labor force participation status is based on the retrospective information for the year prior to each
interview. For the classification of part- and full-time work in each month I follow the convention outlined in the
GSOEP documentation (http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/60055/pgen.pdf).
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Table 1: Observations
Current Nr. of Children
Age Youngest Child 1 2 3 4+
< 3 400 458 126 39
< 6.5 186 332 99 27
< 9.5 131 274 85 30
< 12.5 111 212 59 15
< 15.5 86 129 38 8
< 18.5 64 106 22 8
Note: To avoid biased means if there are trends in labor partici-
pation or child care enrollment within a period, i.e. during a stage
of a child’s adolescence, only periods that are neither interrupted
by another birth nor left or right censored through the first or last
interview are included.
The GSOEP asks for enrollment in paid child care, distinguishing between two different categories,
namely daycare centers and nannies, and whether the child is enrolled part- (during the morning
or afternoon) or full-time (all day). Since virtually all daycare centers receive public subsidies I use
this category for publicly provided child care, henceforth called subsidized child care. During the
observation period parents could claim only in special circumstances, e.g. severe diseases, financial
support for hiring a nanny reflecting that nannies rather constitute a market arrangement. Ac-
cordingly, I label them as non-subsidized child care. The corresponding period enrollment status
for subsidized and non-subsidized child care is then calculated in the same way as the labor force
participation status.8 Finally, aggregate statistics on the provision of subsidized part- and full-time
child care by age groups (zero to two and three to six and a half) are available from the Germans
Statistical Office.9
3 Stylized Facts
This section documents labor force participation and child care enrollment choices for the selected
sample of West German married females.10 These facts will be either used as calibration targets
for the model developed in Section 4 or for the evaluation of the model fit. I further describe
8The child care enrollment status is only known for the interview month. In Appendix A.2 I discuss the imputation
for the remaining months and outline how I deal with changes in the GSOEP child care questions over time.
9In Appendix A.3 I describe how I calculate the period provision rates of subsidized child care such that they
are consistent with the definition of the period labor force participation and child care enrollment status as discussed
before.
10Since the fraction of females with one, two and three children varies by the youngest child’s age, see Table 1, I
weight the corresponding labor force participation and child care enrollment rates by the fraction of females in the
sample with one, two and three children (conditional on having children) which are given in Table 4. This adjustment
has only a small quantitative but no qualitative impact on the presented facts.
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Figure 4: Maternal Labor Force Participation and Child Care
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features of the German child care market, namely the provision of subsidized child care as well as
the parental fees for subsidized and non-subsidized child care, that can be considered as exogenous
for the individual choices and will serve as model inputs.
I start with the discussion of the total maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment
rates and will turn to the part- and full-time differences further below.
3.1 Maternal Labor Force Participation and Child Care
Figure 4 shows that the maternal labor force participation rate increases with the youngest child’s
age but at a strongly decreasing rate. In particular, the major increase happens during pre-school
ages (from 31% to 61%) and at school entry (from 61% to 73%). The subsequent increases are
far smaller and when the youngest child turns adult (ages 16 to 18.5) 80% of the mothers in the
sample are working. The increase of the child care enrollment rate, comprising subsidized and non-
subsidized child care, from 6% for children aged zero to two to 95% for children aged three to six
and a half is much larger than the corresponding increase in the maternal labor force participation
rate. Accordingly, the selected sample displays a similar relationship as the cross-section of EU
countries shown in Figures 1 and 2: the maternal labor force participation rate for the age group
zero to two is much larger than the enrollment rate in paid child care (31% vs. 6%), whereas the
opposite is true for the age group three to six and a half (61% vs. 95%).
Table 2 takes a closer look at this relationship. Only 13.7% of the working mothers whose youngest
child is of age zero to two use paid child care. Given the age of the children the remaining 86.3% of
the working mothers necessarily use some form of non-paid, non-maternal child care to free up the
time to work. Although 95% of the husbands are working full-time, they could still take care of the
children if the females work at another time of the day than their husbands. Grandparents, other
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Table 2: Child Care Enrollment Conditional on Maternal Labor Force Participation Status
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
At least part-time care
Not Working 2.9 93.2
Working 13.7 96.7
Table 3: Child Care Enrollment and Provision
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Enrollment Paid Child Care (Subs. & Non-Subs.) 6.2 95.4
Enrollment Non-Subsidized Child Care
Enrollment Paid Child Care (Subs. & Non-Subs.) 40.4 0.8
Provision Subsidized Child Care 6.1 95.6
family members or friends might also take care of the children at no monetary costs. Since the total
enrollment rate in paid child care is 95% for children aged three to six and a half, it is not surprising
that the respective conditional child care enrollment rates hardly vary with the maternal labor force
participation status. Overall, the correlation between the maternal labor force participation and
child care enrollment rate is weak whereas the correlation of both variables, particularly the child
care enrollment rate, with the children’s age is large.
Table 3 shows that non-subsidized child care is an important source of paid child care in relative
terms for children aged zero to two: among the children in this age group enrolled in paid child care,
40.4% are enrolled in non-subsidized child care, either exclusively or in addition to subsidized child
care. However, in absolute terms this is still negligible (amounting to 2.5% of all children aged zero
to two). For children aged three to six and half non-subsidized child care is hardly used independent
of whether measured in relative or in absolute terms. This latter result is not surprising as the fees
for non-subsidized child care are three to four times as expensive as subsidized child care (see Table
C.6 in Appendix C.3) and, as shown in the third row of Table 3, subsidized child care is available
for nearly all children in that age group. In contrast, only for 6.1% of the children aged zero to two
a subsidized child care slot is available.
The huge disparity of the provision rates between the two age groups stems from the historical
objective to subsidize child care in Germany, namely to offer affordable, high quality pre-school
education for children from age three onwards, see Kreyenfeld, Spieß, and Wagner (2002). Wrohlich
(2008) documents a substantial excess demand for subsidized child care for children aged zero to
two suggesting that a sizeable fraction of mothers are rationed in their choice of the paid child care
mode as they do not have access to subsidized child care. Hence, the fact that for children aged
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Figure 5: Maternal Labor Force Participation and Child Care: Part- vs. Full-time
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zero to two the provision rate exceeds the actual enrollment in subsidized child care (given that a
substantial fraction is enrolled in non-subsidized child care) should therefore rather be interpreted
as a mismatch of supply and demand of subsidized slots than as an excess supply.
3.2 Part- vs. Full-time
Another important feature of the data is the prevalence of part-time maternal labor force participa-
tion, part-time enrollment in paid child care (again, subsidized and non-subsidized) and provision
of part-time subsidized child care, see Figure 5. The profile of the total maternal labor force partici-
pation rate follows the profile of the part-time maternal labor force participation rate until age nine
and a half, while the increase afterwards mainly stems from the full-time labor force participation
rate. Although the full-time child care enrollment for children aged three to six and a half is above
the corresponding full-time maternal labor force participation rate, the usage of non-paid child care
is still pervasive among full-time working mothers in this age group. Only 32.4% of them actually
use full-time child care. About three fourth of the subsidized child care slots are part-time with
the actual enrollment rates in part-time child care being even higher because some full-time slots
are only used part-time.11
11Note that these facts are neither an artifact of distinguishing only by part- and full-time labor force participation
nor of the aggregation of the monthly to the period statuses. The documented patterns also hold qualitatively if one
considers hours worked which are however only available at the interview months. In particular, the results are not
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3.3 Summary Key Facts
The facts documented in this section about labor force participation of married females with chil-
dren and their child care enrollment decisions can be summarized as follows:
1. The maternal labor force participation rate grows as the children age but at a strongly
decreasing rate.
2. Many non-working females use paid child care and many working females do not use paid
child care.
3. Non-subsidized child care is only important for children aged zero to two but only in relative
terms.
4. While subsidized child care is three to four times as cheap as non-subsidized child care, it is
only provided for very few children aged zero to two. Although for nearly all children aged
three to six and a half a subsidized child care slot is available, the majority of those slots is
only part-time.
5. For both, child care enrollment and maternal labor force participation, the part-time rates
exceed the full-time rates.
In the next section, I develop a life-cycle model to explain the set of presented facts on maternal
labor force participation and child care enrollment taken as given the supply of subsidized child
care slots and parental fees for subsidized and non-subsidized child care.
4 The Model
This section introduces a stylized life-cycle model for married females featuring fertility, labor force
participation and child care choices.
4.1 Demographics
A female lives for six periods, each of three year length, reflecting the distinctive stages of a child’s
adolescence, as shown in Figure 3.12 At the beginning of her life she is exogenously matched with
a man and then chooses how many children to have. Both the husband and the children stay with
her throughout her whole life. If a female chooses to have more than one child, all children are
born as multiples. This simplifying assumption is made for tractability.
driven by mothers working very few hours. Conditional on working, only 15.6% (10.6%) of those whose youngest
child is of age zero to two (three to six and a half) are working less than 10 hours. The detailed results are available
upon request.
12For period two the overlap is not exact since the mean duration in the data is three and a half years.
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4.2 Endowments
Females and their husbands are indexed by income shocks ǫ and ǫ∗ which determine the stochastic
component of their market incomes. Asterisks refer to parameters for the husband. Both spouses
are assigned initial income shocks (ǫ1, ǫ
∗
1) in period one which subsequently evolve stochastically
over time according to an AR(1) process:
ǫt = ρǫt−1 + εt with εt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε )
ǫ∗t = ρ
∗ǫ∗t−1 + ε
∗
t with ε
∗
t ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε∗)
(1)
In the first two periods while children are not yet in school, females can enroll them in subsidized
and/or non-subsidized child care. Both types of child care are perfect substitutes with the exception
of the price and availability. In contrast to non-subsidized child care, I assume as in Wrohlich (2006)
and Haan and Wrohlich (2011) that access to subsidized child care slots, denoted as at, is rationed
and randomly assigned to mothers by a lottery with age-dependent success probabilities. These
success probabilities are assumed to be independent of the maternal labor force participation status
or number of children as their is no information in the data that would allow me to identify such
dependencies.
4.3 Preferences
The female is assumed to be the household’s sole decision maker, i.e. she has the full bargaining
power. A childless woman (n = 0) receives utility from her share of household consumption (ψ(n)ct)
and leisure which is the time endowment of one less time worked in the market lt:
ut,n=0 =
(ψ(n)ct)
1−γ0 − 1
1− γ0
+ δ1
(1− lt)
1−γ1 − 1
1− γ1
. (2)
Household consumption (ct) is transformed into the consumption realized by an adult, the female’s
share, using the OECD equivalence scale:
ψ(n) =
1
1.7 + 0.5n
. (3)
The utility function for a mother (n > 0) is different. Her leisure is further reduced by the time
caring for her children (mt) while she receives in addition utility from having children (N) and
child quality (Qt):
ut,n>0 =
(ψ(n)ct)
1−γ0 − 1
1− γ0
+ δ1
(1− lt −mt)
1−γ1 − 1
1− γ1
+ δ2N+ δ3Qt, (4)
where δi ∀ i = 1, 2, 3 measure the contribution of each part to total utility relative to the utility from
consumption. This general specification is relatively standard, see e.g. Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles
(2003) or Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2001). Let me now explain the details of the two ad-
11
ditional parts. The utility from having n > 0 children is
N =
(1 + n)1−γ2 − 1
1− γ2
− ζ. (5)
The first component reflects a decreasing marginal utility in the number of children while the second
component (ζ) is a rescaling factor that only affects the n = 0 vs. n = 1 choice but not any other
decision conditional on having children. It counteracts the large utility gain females receive from
having the first child induced by the first component. Anticipating the calibration results such a
fixed cost of having children, i.e. ζ > 0, is quantitatively needed to induce some females to not
have children. Setting ζ = 0 this result could be also achieved with a sufficiently low value of the
utility weight δ2. In this case however the empirically observed fertility distribution in terms of
number of children could not be matched any longer because the utility differences from having
another child would be too small. A further alternative is a model with a fixed time cost of having
children instead of the rescaling factor ζ. The calibrated fixed cost needed to match the fraction of
females without children would however have to be that large that essentially no mother would be
willing to work full-time any longer. 13 To sum up, introducing a fixed cost of having children in
this fashion is a pragmatic way to generate the observed fertility distribution (in terms of number
of children) without affecting other margins drastically.
The child quality term Qt introduces the main behavioral trade-offs. The concrete specification is
motivated by the facts outlined in Section 3 and similar to Ribar (1995). As their mothers, children
have a time constraint:
mt + ccs,t + ccns,t + ccnp,t = 1. (6)
They either spend time with their mother (mt), are taken care of in a paid child care arrangement,
either subsidized (ccs,t) or non-subsidized (ccs,t), or in a non-paid child care arrangement (ccnp,t).
These inputs affect child quality Qt in the following way:
Qt = ξ(t)m
γ3
t − φ(t)cc
φ2
np,t = ξ(t)m
γ3
t − φ(t) (1−mt − ccs,t − ccns,t)
φ2 . (7)
Note that both types of paid child care, i.e. subsidized and non-subsidized, are perfect substitutes
with the exception of the price and availability. As in Ribar (1995), the effect of paid child care to
overall child quality is ambiguous and depends only on the quality of paid care relative to maternal
and non-paid care. Specifically, I assume that child quality is increasing in maternal time spend
with the children mt and decreasing in the usage of non-paid child care.
14 This latter mechanism
is needed to explain usage of paid child care (which reduces resources for consumption) while non-
paid child care is available, see also Blau and Hagy (1998), Wrohlich (2006) and Tekin (2007).15
Thus, the above setup does not require that for each unit of labor supply one unit of paid child
13Using a very similar model with such time costs, Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003) also do not predict
any childless females because their time costs are still to low.
14Ribar (1995) specifies his estimated model the other way around than Equation (7), i.e. he includes paid child
care usage instead of non-paid child care usage in the utility function. Since the three modes of care, paid, non-paid
and maternal are linked through the time constraint (6) this should not affect the results.
15Blau and Hagy (1998) and Tekin (2007) allow for observed and unobserved quality differences even within one
child care mode. Tekin (2007) assumes that only employed mothers use paid child care which is however at odds
with the data, see Table 2.
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care has to be bought since instead non-paid child care could be used. Without this assumption
the documented fact that not all working females use paid child care, compare Table 2, could not
be generated. Possible interpretations for the utility costs of non-paid child care could be that non-
paid child care arrangements provide lower quality child care than paid child care arrangements
or mothers, the effort to organize care provided by grandparents, other family members or friends,
the foregone joint leisure-time with the husband if he takes care of the children or the disutility
of taking care of the children while working from home (e.g. as self-employed). Still there is no
reason to believe that families actually have direct negative preferences regarding unpaid care, but
the approach is a flexible way to proxy for the direct costs of non-paid care, see Ribar (1995). This
discussion also reveals that it would be too far stretched to interpret Qt as children’s human capital
which is also not done Ribar (1995), Blau and Hagy (1998), Wrohlich (2006) and Tekin (2007). For
a recent structural approach to estimate the effect of employment and child care decisions of married
mothers on children’s cognitive development, see e.g. Bernal (2008).
Hotz and Miller (1988) assume that mothers incur a time cost of having children that declines
geometrically with the age of the children to capture that children of different ages have different
needs. I make a similar assumption and allow for the possibility that the utility mothers receive from
spending time with their children declines geometrically over time, i.e. as the children get older.
This increases both the incentive to use (more) paid and non-paid child care and to participate
(more) in the labor market as the children get older. The speed of the reduction is given by the
parameter ξ1 > 0 whereas the lower bound, i.e. the utility in the last period when children are of
age 15.5 to 18.5, is governed by ξ2 ∈ [0, 1] through the following linear transformation:
ξ(t) = ξ2 +
t−ξ1 − T−ξ1
1− T−ξ1
(1− ξ2) for t = 1, . . . , T and T = 6. (8)
With the focus being on pre-school child care, I assume that the costs of non-paid child care usage
only accrue while children are of pre-school age, i.e.
φ(t) =
{
φ1 for t ≤ 2
0 else.
(9)
Put differently, a mother does not have to organize child care if she does not spend time with her
children after the end of the school day. As in Ribar (1995), Blau and Hagy (1998), Wrohlich (2006)
and Tekin (2007), I assume that every female can use as much non-paid child care as she desires. A
possible justification for this assumption is that the husbands could always take care of the children
while the female is working. The only requirement, given that all husbands are working full-time,
is that the spouses are working at different times of the day. At least in principle this arrangement
is open to all females, although frictions in the real world labor market might limit the choice
of when to work. Table B.1 in Appendix B presents further evidence in favor of the assumption
of unconstrained access to non-paid child care. The children’s grandparents, i.e. the female’s or
husband’s parents, are (next to the husband) the most likely provider of non-paid child care. The
geographical distance towards grandparents is probably one of the most important sources for
heterogeneity in access to non-paid child care. Table B.1 shows that this heterogeneity does hardly
translate in any statistically significant differences of the maternal labor force participation and
child care enrollment rates. Although this is not a proof for an unconstrained access to non-paid
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child care, it is clearly not a rejection of the assumption.
4.4 Budget Constraint
The per-period budget constraint is given by:
ct = τ [yt(lt, xt, ǫt), y
∗
t (t, ǫ
∗
t )]− fcc [n, t, ccs,t, ccns,t, yt, y
∗
t ] + Υ [n, t, lt] . (10)
The function τ calculates the after tax household income from the female’s (yt) and husband’s
(y∗t ) gross income. The latter depends on two components: a deterministic component in time t,
i.e. all husbands are assumed to work full-time and thus accumulate full-time experience,16 and a
stochastic component represented by the husband’s current period income shock (ǫ∗t ). In contrast,
the female’s income depends on her labor supply (lt), accumulated experience (xt) through past
labor force participation
xt = xt−1 + lt−1, with x1 = 0 (11)
and her current period income shock (ǫt). Similar to the vast majority of structural models in-
vestigating labor supply and fertility choices of married females, see e.g. Hotz and Miller (1988),
Francesconi (2002) or Haan and Wrohlich (2011), I abstract from savings. Child care fees fcc de-
pend on the number (n) and age (t) of the children, the utilized amount of subsidized (ccs,t) and
non-subsidized (ccns,t) child care as well as the gross household income. In addition, households
receive transfers Υ conditional on the time period/age of the children (t) and choices (n, lt). The
functional forms for the gross incomes y and y∗, the tax schedule τ , the child care fees fcc and
transfers Υ are specified further below in Section 5.1.
4.5 Choice Variables
All choices are assumed to be discrete. Labor supply lt can take on three values:
lt =


0 for non-working
1
4 for part-time work
1
2 for full-time work
∀ t = 1, . . . , 6. (12)
If the (non-sleeping) time endowment would be 16 hours, then part-time labor force participation
would correspond to four and full-time work to eight hours. Similarly, subsidized ccs,t and non-
subsidized child care ccns,t can take on three values:
cci,t =


0 for no paid child care
1
4 for paid part-time child care
1
2 for paid full-time child care
∀ t = 1, 2 and i = s, ns. (13)
The actual choice of subsidized child care is however restricted by the access at to a subsidized
child care slot:
ccs,t ≤ at ∀ t = 1, 2, (14)
16In the data, 95% of all husbands in the selected sample work full-time.
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Figure 6: Life Cycle
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4 access to subsidized part-time child care
1
2 access to subsidized full-time child care
∀ t = 1, 2. (15)
As already mentioned, the access to a subsidized child care slot is determined by a lottery with
age- and type-dependent, i.e. part- or full-time, success probabilities. Paid child care in subsidized
and non-subsidized arrangements is restricted to
ccs,t + ccns,t ≤
1
2
∀ t = 1, 2, (16)
i.e. child care facilities are only open during the first half of the day in the morning and early
afternoon. A mother can still spend time with her children in the late afternoon and evening such
that in principle
mt ∈
{
0,
1
4
,
1
2
,
3
4
, 1
}
. (17)
However, while she is working and/or the children are in paid child care or later in life in mandatory
costless schooling (st), she cannot spend any time with her children:
mt ≤
{
1−max{lt, ccs,t + ccns,t} ∀ t ≤ 2
1−max{lt, st} ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 6.
(18)
4.6 Dynamic Problem
Figure 6 presents the timing of events during a female’s life which is defined by the stages of her
children’s adolescence (compare also Figure 3). The term zt combines the income shocks of both
spouses (ǫt, ǫ
∗
t ) and the female’s experience level (xt, with x1 = 0). The first period is split up in
two stages with different state and decision variables. In the first stage, the initial income shocks
are assigned and the female chooses the optimal number of children (n) taking into account the
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uncertainty with respect to the access to subsidized child care:
max
n
{Ea1V (1, ǫ1, ǫ
∗
1, x1, n, a1), n = 0, 1, 2, ..., N} , (19)
with V (·) being the female’s value function. Once the optimal number of children (n) is chosen,
n becomes a state variable as the children stay with the mother throughout her entire life. After
access to subsidized child care is determined by the lottery, the female decides on her labor supply
(l1) and those with children, on how much time to spend with them (m1) and on their enrollment
in subsidized child care (ccs,1), possibly restricted by a1, and non-subsidized child care (ccns,1).
The following Bellman equation represents the female’s problem in the second stage:
V (1, ǫ1, ǫ
∗
1, x1, n, a1) = max
m,l,ccs,ccns
u1 + βEǫ,ǫ∗,a2V (2, ǫ2, ǫ
∗
2, x2, n, a2)
subject to (10), (11), (14), (16) and (18).
(20)
u1 is the period-specific utility function (Equation (4)) and β is the discount factor. At the beginning
of period two, the new income shocks (ǫt, ǫ
∗
t ) realize according to the AR(1) process specified in
Equation (1) and access to child care (a2) is drawn from a new lottery. The set of choice variables
in period two is identical to the second decision stage in period one and the value function is given
by
V (2, ǫ2, ǫ
∗
2, x2, n, a2) = max
m,l,ccs,ccns
u2 + βEǫ,ǫ∗V (3, ǫ3, ǫ
∗
3, x3, n, 0)
subject to (10), (11), (14), (16) and (18).
(21)
From period three onwards, children attend mandatory school and females cannot use child care
anymore (at = 0 for t ≥ 3). Hence, a female only decides on how much to work and how much
time to spend with her children:
V (t, ǫt, ǫ
∗
t , xt, n, 0) =max
m,l
ut + βEǫ,ǫ∗V (t+ 1, ǫt+1, ǫ
∗
t+1, xt+1, n, 0) ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 6
subject to (10), (11) and (18)
and V (7, . . . ) = 0.
(22)
4.7 Maternal Leave
An important element affecting labor force participation decisions of females with children aged
zero to two is the German maternal leave regulation. It permits every mother who worked until
the birth of a child to return to her pre-birth employer at her pre-birth wage within three years
after birth. Since in the model life starts with the birth decision, there is no pre-birth labor supply
and I therefore grant all females the right to go on maternal leave.17 Relevant in this setup is
the stochastic part of income. By construction, part- and full-time working mothers work at their
initial or pre-birth wage income shock in period one. Hence, the maternal leave regulation has only
to be modeled explicitly for mothers that do not work in the first period, i.e. for which l1 = 0 or
equivalently x2 = 0. I assume that they draw a new income shock at the beginning of the second
17In the sample investigated here, 94% of all mothers work prior to the first birth.
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period according to Equation (1) (e.g. an offer for a new position) but can opt for the pre-birth
income shock (e.g. return to the pre-birth position) such that the offered wage in the second period
is given by y2 (l2, x2 = 0,max{ǫ1, ǫ2}). The third period income shock is then determined by
ǫ3 =
{
ρ max{ǫ1, ǫ2}+ ε3 if l1 = 0, l2 > 0
ρǫ2 + ε3 else.
5 Calibration
In the following paragraphs, I specify the functional forms for the exogenous model inputs which
are, where applicable, either presented as monthly or annual values. When used in the model all
variables are transformed to correspond to the model period length of three years. All monetary
values are expressed in real terms in 2008e. In this section I further discuss the target moments
for the calibration exercise and the calibrated preference parameters.
5.1 Functional Forms
5.1.1 Income
Husbands In line with the data, all husbands are assumed to work full-time and thus accumulate
full-time experience. I assume that the log of their gross income y∗t is a concave function of
experience and hence of time in the model or, respectively, of the youngest child’s age in the data:
ln y∗t = η
∗
0 + η
∗
1(t− 1) + η
∗
2(t− 1)
2 + ǫ∗t (23)
The gross full-time income yt(lt, xt, ǫt) of a female is given by a classical Mincer (1974) earnings
equation with returns to experience, where full-time work lt =
1
2 , see Equation (12). As a normal-
ization xt is multiplied by two (x˜t = 2xt) such that part-time work increases x˜ by 0.5 and full-time
work by 1:
ln yt = η0 + η1x˜t + η2x˜
2
t + ǫt. (24)
I assume that there is no part-time penalty, i.e. the gross part-time income is half of the gross
full-time income for the same level of experience and the same income shock.
Appendix C.1 describes how the income processes are estimated. Given the specific structure of
the model, standard estimates from the literature cannot be used. Moreover the feature of joint
income taxation (see below) requires to to estimate a gross income process and apply the tax
code afterwards, instead of estimating a net income directly, in order to capture the appropriate
incentives for married females to work. The predicted income profiles are displayed in Figure 7.
For the numerical solution of the model, the AR(1) process for the income shock (Equation (1)) is
discretized into 20 states using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986).
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Figure 7: Income Profiles
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5.1.2 Taxes and Transfers
The tax code implemented in the model incorporates the three key elements of the German tax
system: mandatory social security contributions, progressive and joint taxation.
Employees, excluding civil servants, have to make mandatory contributions to the pension system,
unemployment, long-term care and public health insurance which accrue proportionally to income
up to a contribution limit. In the model I use the average contribution limits and rates for each
type of insurance over the years 1983 to 2006. Similarly, the implemented tax code is based on
the average income taxes over the sample period. The construction of the tax code is described
in Appendix C.2 which also shows the final social security contributions and tax rates used in the
model. In Germany legally married couples are taxed jointly, i.e. the tax code is applied to half of
the sum of the spouses’ incomes and the resulting tax burden is doubled. By the progressivity of
the tax system the joint net income is always at least as large as the sum of the individually taxed
incomes. Although my sample includes some cohabitating but not legally married couples, I apply
joint taxation.
The transfers considered include the average child benefits over the the years 1983 through 2006
which are paid each period depending on the total number of children. The average benefit per
child is slightly increasing in the number children, see Table C.4 in Appendix C.2. Based on
the description in Ludsteck and Schoenberg (2007) non- and part-time working mothers receive in
period one a maternity benefit of 2414.19 e which comprises the maternity benefits paid during
the first six months after a child is born if the mother does not work.
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Table 4: Fertility Distribution
Nr. of Children
0 1 2 3
Fraction 10.7 21.0 50.4 17.8
Note: Figures are based on the 1140 females
from the sample selected in Section 2 who have
completed their fertile period, assumed to end
at the age of forty.
5.1.3 Child Care Fees
The child care fees fcc [n, t, ccs,t, ccns,t, yt, y
∗
t ] consist of two parts: the per-child fees for subsidized
and non-subsidized child care multiplied by the number of children. The per-child fees for subsidized
child care are the predicted values from a Tobit-regression with censoring at 0e and at 447.72 e,
the lowest and highest observed monthly fee for subsidized child care with the following set of
regressors: an intercept, a full-time dummy, a dummy for ages zero to two, number of further
siblings enrolled in subsidized child care, and household income.18 The per-child fees for non-
subsidized child care are the predicted values from an OLS-regression on a constant and a full-time
dummy, the only two regressors that turned out to be statistically significant. The coefficients for
both regressions and predicted fees are shown in Tables C.5 and C.6 in Appendix C.3.
5.1.4 Subsidized Child Care Provision Rates
The age- and type-dependent, i.e. part- and full-time, success probabilities in the lottery deter-
mining access to subsidized child care are taken from Figure 5 and are also shown in Table A.3 in
Appendix A.3.
5.1.5 School Hours
I assume that children attend school part-time (st =
1
4) in periods three and four, i.e. for ages
seven to 12.5, and full-time (st =
1
2) in periods five and six, i.e. for ages 13 to 18.5. Schooling hours
matter by limiting the maximum amount of time the mother can spend with her children, compare
Equation (18).
18The sibling discount and income dependence are part of the regulations for the subsidized child care fees. I
define household income as the average monthly income of both spouses in the year the fee is observed deflated by
the OECD equivalence scale given by Equation (3) to account for different household sizes.
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5.2 Data Targets
The discount factor β is set to
(
1
1.04
)3
as in Kydland and Prescott (1982). The remaining 12
preference parameters are calibrated by matching 12 moments that are grouped in three data
categories. I assign each parameter to the group where the influence is felt the heaviest and try to
argue as far as possible in how far the data are informative about the respective parameter values.
Since however aggregate statistics are matched, as opposed to individual data, and all parameters
jointly determine the model statistics, the following discussion is only suggestive and informal.
Fertility While ζ reflects the fixed costs of having a positive number of children, δ2 and γ2 gov-
ern the direct utility of having children. Accordingly these three preference parameters strongly
influence the fertility outcomes. I target the fraction of females without, with one and with two
children. Table 4 shows the empirical fertility distribution for a maximum of three children per
female which are adjusted for the fact that around 3.5% of all couples are unable to get children
at all, see Robert Koch Institut and German Statistical Office (2004).
Labor Force Participation Since the focus of the analysis is on child care and thus the pre-school
ages, I target the average (over all mothers) part- and full-time labor force participation rate when
children are of ages zero to two and three to six and a half. In addition, both rates are targeted in
the last period considered, i.e. when children are of ages 15.5 to 18.5. The six parameters governing
the time allocation of the mother, i.e. leisure (δ1 and γ1) and time spend with the children (δ3,
γ3, ξ1 and ξ2) have the tightest link to this data category. In particular, in period one neither ξ1
nor ξ2 have a direct impact on the utility of time spent with children since ξ(1) = 1 ∀ ξ1, ξ2. The
labor force participation decision in period six is as well independent of ξ1 but strongly influenced
by ξ2 which sets the utility of time spent with children in the last period. ξ1 in turn determines
how fast the utility of time spent with the children decreases and the functional form of Equation
(8) implies the largest decrease to happen between period one and two. Accordingly the value of
ξ1 has a strong influence on the labor force participation rate in period two.
Furthermore, I target the difference in the part-time labor force participation rate between mothers
with one and two children of age zero to two. This statistic is affected by γ0 through the budget
constraint where the effect of labor force participation is interacted with the number of children
via the equivalence scale adjustment.
Child Care Enrollment I target the part- and full-time child care enrollment rate of children
aged three to six and a half (again as averages over all mothers). The parameter φ1 gives the weight
on the disutility of using non-paid child care and φ2 governs how costly it is to increase the usage
of non-paid child care.
Since no closed form solution of the corresponding model moments is available, I simulate 100,000
individuals. The initial income shocks are drawn from the stationary distribution implied by the
estimated parameters of Equation (1). Despite the discrete nature of all choices, small changes
around the calibrated parameters induce small changes of the model statistics because of the large
heterogeneity. This is also true for the fertility outcomes. Even the most likely initial combination
of spousal income shocks occurs only with a probability of 1.7%.19
19I used for the calibration of the model parameters the asynchronous parallel pattern search algorithm described
in Gray and Kolda (2006), and Kolda (2005). The corresponding software (APPSPACK) is freely available on the web
(https://software.sandia.gov/appspack/version5.0/index.html) and was run in parallel mode on the Deutsche
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Table 5: Targeted Data and Model moments
Target Data Model ∆Data-Model
Fertility
Fraction of females
without children 10.7 10.1 0.6
with one child 21.0 20.0 1.0
with two children 50.4 51.2 −0.8
Maternal Labor Force Participation Rate
Part-time
t = 1 26.5 26.5 0.0
t = 2 53.2 54.3 −1.1
t = 6 60.0 59.0 1.0
t = 1; ∆{n=1}−{n=2} 10.9 10.9 0.0
Full-time
t = 1 4.7 4.8 −0.1
t = 2 8.4 8.2 0.2
t = 6 19.7 19.5 0.2
Child Care Enrollment Rate
Part-time
t = 2 83.7 81.8 1.9
Full-time
t = 2 11.6 12.9 −1.3
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Table 6: Preference Parameters
Fertility
Number of children δ2= 1.12 γ2= 1.39
Fixed cost of children ζ= 0.53
Maternal Labor Force Participation
Consumption γ0= 1.98
Leisure δ1= 0.23 γ1= 2.33
Maternal time δ3= 2.23 γ3= 0.45 ξ1= 0.03 ξ2= 0.41
Child Care Enrollment
Non-paid child care φ1= 0.21 φ2= 2.45
5.3 Results
Table 5 shows the data moments along with the simulated model moments for the calibrated model
version. Table 6 lists the calibrated preference parameters sorted by the calibration targets with
a reference to the corresponding parts in the utility function. Let me briefly comment on a few of
the calibrated preference parameters. First, the curvature of consumption is in the range of usually
cited values. Second, even after rescaling the utility from having children (γ2 = 1.39) with the fixed
cost (ζ = 0.53) having children is always associated with a positive utility (0.08 for the first child).
Third, the utility of maternal time spent with the children decreases at a very modest speed as the
children age and is for children aged 15.5 to 18.5 (ξ2 = 0.41) less than half of the utility for children
aged zero to two (ξ1 = 0.03).
6 Model Evaluation
To judge the model’s performance, I now turn to a set of non-targeted moments that are at the core
of the analysis, namely child care enrollment for children aged zero to two and the joint maternal
labor force participation and child care enrollment choices.20
Bank/E-Finance Lab House of Finance Servercluster.
20In Appendix D I discuss a set of non-targeted moments which were were only touched on in the presentation of
stylized facts in Section 3.
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Table 7: Non-Targeted Moments: Child Care Enrollment Rates
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Data Model Data Model
Part-time 5.6 4.0 Target
[3.1 ; 8.2]
Full-time 0.6 0.5 Target
[0.0 ; 1.3]
Fraction Enrolled in 40.4 14.8 0.8 0.1
Non-Subs. Care [14.1 ; 66.7] [0.0 ; 2.0]
Note: 95% confidence intervals for the data moments are given in brackets.
6.1 Child Care Enrollment
In the model two mechanisms are at work that both generate a lower child care enrollment rate
for children aged zero to two compared to children aged three to six and a half. First, the utility
mothers receive from spending time with their children declines as the children get older. This in
turn increases the incentive to use (more) paid and non-paid child care and to participate (more)
in the labor market when the children are of ages three to six and a half compared to when the
children are of ages zero to two. Second, the cost of using paid child care relative to non-paid child
care are higher for children aged zero to two. While the usage of non-paid child care is assumed
to be associated with the same utility costs for both pre-school age groups, the utility loss from
the usage of paid child care through reduced consumption is very different. Mothers with children
aged zero to two who want to use paid child care will mainly have to resort to non-subsidized child
care because of the low availability of subsidized child care. In addition, paid child care is more
expensive for children aged zero to two: in relative terms because the household income (conditional
on the maternal labor force participation status) is on average lower; in absolute terms because
subsidized child care fees are on average associated with an extra charge of up to 30% per month,
compare Table C.6 in Appendix C.3.
The question is now how well these two mechanisms are jointly able to predict child care enrollment
for children aged zero to two. E.g. it could be that the higher costs of paid child care do not matter
at all if for working mothers without access to a subsidized slot, the costs of non-subsidized child
care are still below the costs of using non-paid child care. As an implication, the predicted child
care enrollment rates for children aged zero to two by the model would be much higher than in
the data. The upper panel of Table 7 demonstrates that this is not the case. The two model
mechanisms described above predict the full-time child care enrollment rate precisely (0.5% vs.
0.6%) and part-time enrollment falls only slightly short relative to the data (4.0% vs. 5.6%). The
latter difference mainly stems from a too low usage of non-subsidized child care in the model
compared to the data (14.8% vs. 40.4%). Nevertheless, both rates in the model still fall in the
respective 95% confidence intervals and are qualitatively consistent with the low part-time child
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Table 8: Non-Targeted Moments: Conditional Child Care Enrollment Rates
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Data Model Data Model
At least part-time care
Not Working 2.9 2.7 93.2 92.1
[0.6 ; 5.1] [87.9 ; 98.7]
Working 13.7 11.6 96.7 96.4
[7.3 ; 20.5] [94.2 ; 99.1]
Full-time care
Full-time Working 3.9 2.7 32.4 28.8
[0.0 ; 11.2] [16.7 ; 47.6]
Note: 95% confidence intervals for the data moments are given in brackets.
care enrollment rate for children aged zero to two in the data.
The model further predicts correctly that for children aged three to six and a half non-subsidized
child care is irrelevant. This result is basically implied by the choice of calibration targets, i.e. by
matching the part- and full-time child care enrollment rates for this age group at the prevailing
provision rates of subsidized child care.
6.2 Conditional Child Care Enrollment
Table 8 shows that the child care enrollment rates conditional on the maternal labor force par-
ticipation status predicted by the model are as well close to the data for both age groups. Very
different outcomes for the conditional child care enrollment rates would have also been consistent
with matching and explaining the (unconditional) child care enrollment and maternal labor force
participation rates. E.g. all and not only 28.8% of the full-time working females with children aged
three to six and a half (8.2 %, see Figure 4) could have been using full-time child care and the
full-time child care enrollment rate (12.9%, see Figure 4) could have been generated by a lower
usage of full-time child care of non- and part-time working mothers.
The successful prediction of the conditional child care enrollment rates cannot be explained by a
single mechanism in the model but rather reflects that the main trade-offs mothers face in real life
are captured well by the model. Just to give one example: the assignment of subsidized child care
slots is random and does not favor working women. This contributes to the relative low full-time
child care enrollment rates conditional on working full-time. These outcomes are of course not
independent from the costs of non-paid child care (also relative to non-subsidized child care) and
the selection into full-time participation.
To sum up, with the focus of the paper being on the joint labor force participation and child care
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enrollment choices of mothers, the good predictions of the non-targeted child care moments provide
confidence in the model’s explanatory power.
7 Policy Experiments
In April 2008 the German Federal government, back then a coalition of christian (CDU/CSU) and
social democrats (SPD), passed the Kinderfo¨rderungsgesetz [Kifo¨g]. I evaluate the major parts of
this law that concern the provision of subsidized child care for children aged zero to two.
7.1 Setup of the Reforms
Reform 1: For all children younger than age three a subsidized child care slot shall be provided
from October 2010 onwards if both parents are working. (§24 I 2 and §24a III Sozialgesetzbuch 8)
The bill on the Kifo¨g was introduced with the following statement: “Many parents do not realize
their desired fertility level, because of the incompatibility of family and working life ... Therefore
it is necessary to improve the compatibility of family and working life. To achieve this, we need
more high quality child care for children younger than age three.” German Federal Parliament
(2008) By this article, the coalition expected to achieve a child care enrollment rate of 35% of all
children younger than age three, and thus compliance with the target of 33% set by the European
Commission at its Barcelona meeting in 2002, and to close the gap to the “exemplary standards in
Western and Northern European countries, for which a relationship between child care enrollment,
maternal employment and fertility is observed”, see Sharma and Steiner (2008). The reform is
straightforward to implement in the context of the model by conditioning access to subsidized child
care (a1) on the labor force participation status (l1):
a1 ≥ l1. (25)
While full-time working females can always use subsidized part-time or full-time child care, I main-
tain the assumption that non-working females rely on the initially specified slot lottery to have
access to subsidized child care. Part-time working females are in-between because they can always
use subsidized part-time child care but subsidized full-time child care only if they are successful in
the slot lottery.
Reform 2: From August 2013 onwards all children of age one and two are entitled to a subsidized
child care slot. (§24 II Sozialgesetzbuch 8)
This passage can be seen in the tradition of providing subsidized child care as a means of af-
fordable, high quality pre-school education also for children aged one to two. This view is con-
firmed in a dossier of the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
Sharma and Steiner (2008) accompanying the Kifo¨g in which among others the beneficial aspects
of the enrollment in high-quality child care for infantile education are pointed out. Already in the
1990’s an entitlement to a subsidized child care slot was introduced for children aged three to six
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Table 9: Policy Regimes
Access Probability (in %) to ... Subsidized Child Care
No Part-time Full-time
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 94.0 ∀ l 4.3 ∀ l 1.7 ∀ l
Reform 1
94.0 if l = 0
0.0 else
4.3 if l = 0
100.0 else
1.7 if l ≤ 14
100.0 else
Reform 2 0.0 ∀ l 100.0 ∀ l
1.7 if l ≤ 14
100.0 else
Note: l = 0/ 1
4
/ 1
2
corresponds to non-/part-/full-time working.
and a half which referred to part-time slots only.21 I therefore assume that the “new” entitlement
also refers to part-time subsidized child care. The actual law applies to all children of age one and
two whereas the model period comprises ages zero to two, i.e. one year more. Given the variables
definition employed in Section 2 and Appendix A.3, access to a subsidized part-time child care slot
for only two years in the data still corresponds to access to a subsidized part-time child care slot for
the whole model period. Hence, Reform 2 will be implemented such that all mothers of children
aged zero to two have at least access to a subsidized part-time child care slot for their children
independent of their labor force participation status. Non- and part-time working mothers might
still draw from the lottery a subsidized full-time child care slot with the success probability from
the Baseline setup.
Table 9 compares the Baseline setup with the previously described reforms. The parental fees for
subsidized and non-subsidized child care are kept at the values of the Baseline setup.
I evaluate the impact of the reforms in three steps. I first compare the outcome from the Baseline
setup with the two experiments holding the fertility choice fixed, i.e. I ask: how would the females
behave if they had have made their fertility choice under the Baseline setup but then faced a setup
as described by the respective reforms? This permits to disentangle the direct effect on maternal
labor force participation and child care enrollment from the one induced through changes in the
fertility choices. In the second step, I discuss the impact of each reform on the fertility choices.
Afterwards I summarize the results for the female and maternal labor force participation rates
and the child care enrollment rates taking the changes in the fertility outcomes into account and
contrast them with case of holding fertility fixed.
21Note that in the Baseline setup the total provision rate of subsidized child care for children aged three to six
and a half is only 95.6% because of the lower provision rates in the first half of the observation period (up to the mid
1990’s). Increasing the provision rate of part-time subsidized child care from 71.5% to 75.9% for children aged three
to six and a half in the calibrated model, i.e. for each child at least a part-time subsidized child care slot is available,
has no qualitative impact on the results.
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Table 10: Fixed Fertility - Maternal Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment
Participation Enrollment
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 26.5 4.8 4.0 0.5
Reform 1 +3.2 +1.7 +27.3 +6.3
Reform 2 +3.2 +1.7 +53.7 +6.3
Ages 3 to 18.5 (Avg.)
Baseline 60.0 10.8 − −
Reform 1 0.0 0.0 − −
Reform 2 0.0 0.0 − −
Note: The entries for the Baseline scenario refer to the maternal labor force
participation and child care enrollment rates prior to Reform 1 and 2. The
entries for Reform 1 and 2 refer to the percentage point changes of the respec-
tive maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates relative
to the Baseline scenario.
As a word of caution, the experiments conducted here abstract from any problems in the actual
implementation of the reforms. In real life, no one expects the promised subsidized child care slots
to be fully available at the date of the implementation of the law. It will rather take a few years
until the predictions of the paper maybe contrasted with the empirical data.
7.2 Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment with Fixed Fertility
Table 10 restates the maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates from the
Baseline setup and the resulting change in percentage points under each reform. The fertility
choices are held constant at their values from the Baseline setup.
Ages 0 to 2 Under Reform 1, all part-time (full-time) working mothers with children aged
zero to two have access to a part-time (full-time) subsidized child care slot. Part-time working
mothers may still gain access to a full-time slot through the initial lottery whereas non-working
women entirely rely on the initial lottery. This policy increases the part- and full-time maternal
labor force participation rates by 3.2 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively. Thus in total 4.9
percentage points or 15.7% more mothers are working. For these mothers the lack of subsidized
child care constituted a barrier to work. Although the results are not fully comparable, the increase
in maternal labor force participation is very similar to difference-in-differences estimates from a
drastic increase of subsidized child care in the late 1990’s in the Canadian province of Quebec.
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Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) estimate for two-parent families an increase of the maternal
labor force participation rate of 7.7 percentage points or 14.5% and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008)
estimate for all mothers an increase of up to 8.1 percentage points or 13%. Blau and Currie (2006)
summarize the price elasticities of maternal labor force participation with respect to the costs of
paid child care for 20 studies for the US. The smallest elasticities in absolute value are found
by Ribar (1995), Blau and Hagy (1998), and Tekin (2007), the only three studies that allow for
non-paid, non-maternal child care. The elasticity implied by Reform 1 of -0.2 coincides with the
upper bound of the range of estimates from these three studies (-0.09 to -0.2).22 One may interpret
these comparisons as giving credibility to the model’s predictions. The increase in the child care
enrollment rates induced by Reform 1 is with 27.3 and 6.3 percentage points much larger than
for maternal labor force participation because mothers that worked in the Baseline setup without
using paid child care now substitute non-paid with subsidized child care. This documents a large
excess demand for subsidized child care among working mothers.
The difference between Reform 1 and Reform 2 for children aged zero to two is that non-working
females also have access to a subsidized part-time child care slot. Under this setup an additional
26.4 (53.7-27.3) percentage points of the mothers are starting to use subsidized part-time child
care, while none of the other variables changes. This means that under Reform 1 no mother is
working just to be able to use subsidized child care. As mentioned before, the policy makers have
set up Reform 2 to provide affordable, high quality pre-school education also for children in this
age group. This presumes that child care has a beneficial aspect on the children’s human capital
which is however not captured by the child quality measure employed in this paper and also out of
the scope of the analysis. Nevertheless, from the perspective of policy makers the higher enrollment
rates can thus be judged as a success of Reform 2. Of further interest might be which mothers
and thus which children are most affected by Reforms 1 and 2 as it is often argued that high
quality child care is particular beneficial for children from low income families. While this latter
hypothesis cannot be addressed, the model makes predictions on the former question.
Figure 8 compares the maternal labor force participation rates (left panel) and child care enrollment
rates (right panel) under the Baseline scenario and Reforms 1 and 2 by potential income quintiles.
These are constructed with the period one, gross joint income of all couples with children assuming
the female would be working full-time. This measure has two advantages over the actual gross joint
income. First, otherwise the quintiles of the Baseline scenario would not be comparable to those
of Reforms 1 and 2 because of the change in the labor force participation choices. Second, one
and two earner couples with the same actual gross (or even net) income might have very different
incentives to use child child care because of the different female labor force participation statuses.
Under Reform 1 the largest (percentage point) increase of the maternal labor force participation
rate occurs for mothers from the first and second quintile. As all working mothers in this scenario
use subsidized child care, the increase and the level of the child care enrollment rate in the two
lowest potential income quintiles is as well the highest. This is in stark contrast to Reform 2
where only households with a non-working woman from the upper quintiles, mainly the fourth and
the fifth, afford the additionally available subsidized child care. Hence, while potential income poor
families benefit disproportionately from Reform 1, only potential income rich households benefit
22I compute this elasticity only for the model with fixed fertility as the reference studies employ models with
exogenous, and thus fixed, fertility.
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Figure 8: Policy Effects with Fixed Fertility by Potential Income
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from Reform 2. This latter result could be reversed or at least mitigated by lowering the fees
further for low income households.
A last interesting aspect regards the comparison of the Baseline setup with Reform 2. With the
exception of the access to subsidized full-time child care, Reform 2 introduces a setup for children
aged zero to two comparable to the Baseline setup for children aged three to six. In this age group
in the Baseline setup, but also under Reforms 1 and 2, only 63% of the mothers are working
but 95% are using subsidized child care. The implied gap of 32 percentage points is very similar
to the gap of 29 percentage points for children aged zero to two under Reform 2, where 36% of
the mothers are working but 65% are using child care. Put differently, with the same access to
subsidized part-time child care for both age groups, the fraction of females not working but using
paid child care is nearly the same for both age groups under Reform 2.
Ages 3 to 18.5 The higher accumulated experience when the children are of ages zero to two
does neither affect maternal labor force participation nor child care enrollment later in life relative
to the Baseline setup. This is because all females affected by the reforms would anyway participate
in the labor market once their children turn three.
To sum up, for the same fertility choices as in the Baseline setup, Reform 1 demonstrates that the
lack of subsidized child care for children aged zero to two constitutes a barrier to start working or
to work more. The total maternal labor force participation rate goes up by 15% or 4.9 percentage
points, comparable to the Quebec experience, and the full-time maternal labor force participa-
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Table 11: Policy Effect on Fertility
Fraction with n children Fertility
0 1 2 3 Rate
Baseline 10.1 20.0 51.2 18.7 1.78
Reform 1 −2.9 +2.1 0.0 +0.8 +0.05
Reform 2 −2.9 +2.1 0.0 +0.8 +0.05
Note: The entries for the Baseline scenario refer to the fertility distribution
and fertility rate prior to Reform 1 and 2. The entries for Reform 1 and
2 refer to the change of the fertility distribution and the fertility rate,
respectively, relative to the Baseline scenario.
tion rate even by 35% or 1.7 percentage points. The implied elasticity of maternal labor force
participation with respect to the child care costs is of a similar magnitude than those obtained
from other studies allowing for non-paid child care. These changes in the maternal labor force
participation rates do however not lead to an increased labor supply later in life. Furthermore,
according to Reform 2 a substantial excess demand for subsidized child care exists also among
non-working mothers of children aged zero to two. Finally, while potential income poor families
benefit disproportionately from Reform 1, only potential income rich households benefit from
Reform 2.
7.3 Fertility
In the previous subsection fertility choices were fixed to those from the Baseline specification.
Increasing the availability of subsidized child care might however affect the fertility choices as well.
Table 11 compares the fraction of females with zero to three children from the Baseline setup to
those when fertility is allowed to respond optimally to the new settings under Reforms 1 and 2.
Under Reform 1 the fraction of females without children decreases by 2.9 percentage points, i.e.
by nearly 30%. For the fraction of females with two children only the net change is 0.0. In fact, 0.8
percentage points of the females with one child switch to having two children and 0.8 percentages
of the females with two children switch to having three children. The total increase in the fertility
rate amounts to 0.05 children per female. In analogy to the previously cited introductory statement
of the Kifo¨g German Federal Parliament (2008), Reform 1 allows more parents to have their first
child or more children by improving the compatibility between family and working life through the
provision of subsidized child care. These small effects are consistent with the empirical evidence
provided in Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003) who do not find a significant impact of the availability of
subsidized child care on first and second birth risks in Germany using the variation in the provision
of subsidized child care across German counties (Kreise).
Under Reform 2 additionally non-working mothers of children aged zero to two are granted access
to subsidized child care. There is no further reaction in the fertility distribution or fertility rate
relative to Reform 1. Put differently, only those females who are constrained in their labor force
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Table 12: Flexible Fertility - Maternal Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment
Participation Enrollment
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 26.5 4.8 4.0 0.5
Reform 1 +5.0 +2.4 +29.1 +7.0
Reform 2 +5.0 +2.4 +54.6 +7.0
Ages 3 to 18.5 (Avg.)
Baseline 60.0 10.8 − −
Reform 1 +0.1 +0.7 − −
Reform 2 +0.1 +0.7 − −
Note: The entries for the Baseline scenario refer to the maternal labor force
participation and child care enrollment rates prior to Reform 1 and 2. The
entries for Reform 1 and 2 refer to the percentage point changes of the respec-
tive maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates relative
to the Baseline scenario.
participation choice through the lack of subsidized child care are also constrained in their fertility
choice.
7.4 Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment with Flexible Fertility
Table 12 compares the maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates under
Reforms 1 and 2 with the Baseline scenario for the flexible (endogenous) fertility choice. The part-
time (full-time) labor force participation rate of mothers with children aged zero to two increases
by 5.0 (2.4) percentage points if fertility is flexible but only by 3.2 (1.7) percentage points if fertility
is held fixed, see also Table 10. These differences are reflected one to one (in percentage points) in
higher part- and full-time child care enrollment rates. The larger maternal labor force participation
with flexible fertility also transpires (in contrast to fixed fertility) to the later ages and stems from
two sources. First, to support the larger family size more mothers are working (more). Second, the
sample of mothers is increased by the previously childless females which have a higher tendency to
participate in the labor market. This latter point however also shows that it is in fact misleading
to compare maternal labor force participation rates. Ultimately, most relevant for the economy are
the changes in the female labor force participation rate which are again comparable under the fixed
and flexible fertility scenario. These are compared in Table 13.
Both for ages zero to two and on average over the entire life-cycle, accounting for the adjustment in
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Table 13: Fixed vs. Flexible Fertility - Female Labor Force Participation
Fixed Fertility Flexible Fertility
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time
Ages 0 to 2
Baseline 23.8 14.4 23.8 14.4
Reforms 1 and 2 +2.9 +1.5 +5.4 −0.5
Life-cycle Averages
Baseline 49.3 18.5 49.3 18.5
Reforms 1 and 2 +0.5 +0.2 +2.3 −1.5
Note: The entries for the Baseline scenario refer to the female labor force partici-
pation rates prior to Reform 1 and 2. The entries for Reform 1 and 2 refer to
the percentage point changes of the respective female labor force participation rates
relative to the Baseline scenario.
fertility results in higher part-time female (not maternal) labor force participation rates but lower
full-time female labor force participation rates. The key reason is that the previously childless
females used to work full-time when not having children but switch (at least partly) to part-time
participation in order to spend time with their newly born children. Following the previously
made assumption that part-time work is half of full-time work, one can calculate the change in
aggregate female labor input relative to the Baseline scenario for the case of fixed and flexible
fertility. For the former this change amounts to 2.95 percentage points (2.9×12+1.5) and to 2.2
percentage points (5.4×12 -0.5) for the latter when children are of ages zero to two, and to 0.45
percentage points and -0.35 percentage points on average over the life-cycle, respectively. This
implies a strong overestimation of the implied labor supply responses for all females if one does
not allow for the adjustment in the fertility choice and points to the importance of endogenizing
fertility even though the change in the fertility rate is relatively small.
A final interesting question concerns the government budget effects of the two reforms. Obviously,
given the pure life-cycle setup I am not able to account for any general equilibrium effects, e.g.
the effect of the increased labor supply on equilibrium wages or of a higher fertility rate on the
social security system in the future. Nevertheless, it is relatively simple to calculate the net effects
at the given tax rates and costs of subsidizing a particular child care slot. While there is no
information about the fixed costs of creating a subsidized child care slot (e.g. building a new or
extending an existing facility), Kolvenbach, Haustein, Krieger, Seewald, and Weber (2004) report
that the subsidies cover on average around 75% of the operating expenses per subsidized child care
slot or alternatively, on average the parental fees correspond to 1/4 of the operating expenses. I
therefore abstract from any fixed costs and assume that the governmental costs for each type of
subsidized child care slot (distinguished by age group and part- or full-time) correspond to four
times the average reported fee in the GSOEP for the specific category (i.e. by age group and part-
or full-time) less the actual fees paid.
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Table 14: Fixed vs. Flexible Fertility - Government Budget
Fixed Fertility Flexible Fertility
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 1 Reform 2
Tax Revenue (TR) +0.8 +0.8 +0.5 +0.5
TR - Child Care Subs. (CCS) −1.1 −2.8 −1.6 −3.4
Social Security Contributions† (SSC) +0.5 +0.5 +0.2 +0.2
TR - CCS + SSC −0.1 −0.8 −0.5 −1.2
Note: Each entry refers to the percentage point change of the discounted sum over all periods for the respective
categorie (e.g. Tax Revenue) relative to the Baseline scenario. The same discount factor as in the optimization
problem is used, i.e.
(
1
1.04
)3
. † Employee and Employer Contributions
Table 14 lists the discounted (over the six periods) effects on the government budget over the entire
life-cycle. Since the labor supply and fertility responses are the same under Reforms 1 and 2,
the tax revenue (TR) and social security contributions (SSC) are as well the same. Moreover,
given the lower aggregate female labor supply they are smaller if fertility is flexible (endogenous).
Abstracting from the employee and employer social security contributions, the fixed fertility scenario
is associated with a 1.1 percentage points lower government budget for Reform 1 whereas the
flexible fertility scenario is associated with a 1.6 percentage points lower government budget, both
measured relative to the Baseline scenario. Put differently the costs of Reform 1 are higher by
1/3 if the fertility response is considered as well. For Reform 2 the costs are about 1/5 larger.
If the additional employee and employer social security contributions are added to an extended
government budget, the latter only decrease by -0.1 percentage points for Reform 1 in the case
of fixed fertility but still amount to -0.5 percentage points if fertility is flexible, i.e. are 5 times
larger. For Reform 2 the difference is only around 1/2. While these numbers certainly have to be
taken with caution, e.g. any fixed costs of offering more subsidized child care slots and any general
equilibrium effects are ignored, these results show that it is important to endogenize fertility even
if the effect on the fertility rate alone is small. The key reason is that the previously childless
females used to work full-time when not having children but switch (at least partly) to part-time
participation in order to spend time with their newly born children.
7.5 Summary
Reform 1 achieves both goals it was set out to. Through the provision of subsidized child care
conditional on the maternal labor force participation status not only barriers for the labor force
participation of mothers with children aged zero to two but also for the fertility choices are re-
moved. The fertility rate increases by 0.05 children per female. Despite the small effect on the
fertility rate, it is important to endogenize fertility as in this case the aggregate female labor force
participation rate decreases (opposed to the case of fixed/exogenous fertility). Furthermore, the
German government expected to achieve a child care enrollment for children aged zero to two of
35%. The resulting child care enrollment rate is with 40.6% not that much above the expected
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level. Given the higher maternal labor force participation rates, households with a low potential
income benefit disproportionately from Reform 1.
Under Reform 2 which is supposed to become effective three years after Reform 1 additional
25.5 percentage points of the children will be enrolled in child care. This was the intention of
the reform. There is however no additional effect on the fertility rate as only females constrained
in their labor force participation choice are constrained in their fertility choice through the lack
of subsidized child care. In contrast to Reform 1, only the potential income rich households
with non-working mothers take advantage of the additional subsidized child care slots provided by
Reform 2.
8 Conclusion
At its Barcelona meeting in March 2002, the European Council recommended its member states
to improve the provision of child care and even set explicit target levels. The intention of the
initiative was to remove barriers for female labor force participation and possibly foster fertility.
This paper asks within the context of a life-cycle model how important the provision of child care
is quantitatively for female labor force participation and fertility.
In line with the facts of a cross-section of OECD countries, I document for a sample of married
females in West Germany that the maternal labor force participation rate is substantially larger
than the child care enrollment rate for children aged zero to two whereas the opposite is the case
for children aged three to six and a half. Put differently, the correlation between the maternal labor
force participation and child care enrollment rates is weak whereas the correlation of both variables,
particularly the child care enrollment rate, with the childrens’ age is large. Historical experience
and empirical evidence for Germany suggest that the supply of subsidized child care is fixed in the
short run despite an excess demand for it, in particular for children aged zero to two. The key
question asked in this paper is in how far this fixed supply of subsidized child care at the given prices
for rationed subsidized and non-rationed non-subsidized child care affects the maternal labor force
participation, child care enrollment and fertility choices. To address this issue I endogenize these
choices within a quantitative, dynamic life-cycle model and distinguish between maternal time, paid
child care provided in public (subsidized) and market (non-subsidized) arrangements as well as non-
paid child care (e.g. by grandparents). The option of non-paid, non-maternal child care is crucial
to explain the observed age-dependent relationships between maternal labor force participation
and child care enrollment and to avoid biased coefficient estimates, see Blau (2003). This point
is neglected by the majority of studies about child care and female labor force participation, in
particular by all that feature an endogenous fertility choice.
I use a calibrated version of the model to evaluate two policy reforms passed by the German
government in 2008. In particular, the first reform aims at implementing the targets for child care
provision set by the European Council by providing working mothers with subsidized child care
slots. The results of the two experiments can be summarized as follows. Increasing the provision
of subsidized child care increases the maternal force participation rate while children are of ages
zero to two. The maternal labor supply responses and elasticity with respect to the cost of child
care are consistent with other empirical estimates. However, only females that are constrained
in their labor force participation choice by the lack of subsidized child care are also constrained
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in their fertility choice. Although the effect on fertility is small, I show that with regard to the
overall effect on female labor supply and the costs of the reforms it is important to take the
fertility adjustment in response to the reforms into account. Otherwise the labor supply effects
are substantially overestimated whereas the costs are underestimated. Finally, it has to be kept in
mind that the results only apply to a selected sample of females, namely those in stable long-term
relationships, and not necessarily to the whole population of females.
Since the low maternal labor force participation, child care enrollment and fertility rates in Germany
are representative for Continental Europe the derived policy implications should be of interest for
other Continental European countries. The results of the evaluated reforms suggest that increasing
the provision of child care may not be sufficient for Continental Europe to catch up to with the
high maternal labor force participation and fertility rates in Western and Northern Europe. Differ-
ences along other dimensions, in particular aspects of taxation, might matter much more, see e.g.
Jaumotte (2003) or Manuelli and Seshadri (2009).
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Sample Selection
Table A.1: Sample Selection Criteria
Frequency
Criterion Absolute Relative
West German†, born 1955-1975 4921 100.0%
No move to East German territory 4881 99.2%
Mothers 2868 58.8%
Childless 2013 41.2%
Mothers 2868 100.0%
Births only in relationships 2276 79.4%
Births only in one relationship 2238 78.0%
Relationship intact at last interview 1938 67.6%
Childless 2013 100.0%
At least age forty at last interview 424 21.1%
and in a relationship at age forty
Relationship intact at last interview 177 8.8%
Source: GSOEP 1984-2007.
† Females are assigned to West Germany by their location in 1989 or,
if this information is not available, by the sample region at their first
interview.
The focus of this paper is on labor force participation choices by mothers rather than childless
females. In addition, I do not investigate the timing and spacing of births but only completed
fertility choices. Hence, childless females are only used for the fertility analysis and therefore only
included if they are at their last interview at least of age forty, the assumed age of the end of a
woman’s fertile period, and if their current relationship started prior to age forty such that they at
least theoretically could have had given birth to a child during that marital spell.
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A.2 GSOEP Child Care Questions
Child Care Enrollment Imputation Information on the child care enrollment status for each
child is only available at the interview date, i.e. usually once a year, and is therefore imputed for
the other months of the year based on the following reasoning: Since school starts at the same time
for all children (at least within one state), the oldest cohort in a daycare center leaves the daycare
center together at the same time of the year, i.e. usually at the end of the first half of the year.
Therefore the majority of entries into daycare centers occurs at the beginning of the second half of
the year. Hence, the child care enrollment status in the first half (January to June) of a year is a
good predictor for the status in the second half (July to December) of the previous year. Similarly,
the child care enrollment status in the second half of a year is a good predictor for the child care
enrollment status in first half of the next year. If the interview month is in the first half of the
year, which is the case for more than 90% of the interviews, I use this child care enrollment status
also for the second half of the previous year if no interview has been conducted in the second half
of the previous year. Analogously, if the interview month is in the second half of the year I use
this child care enrollment status also for the first half of the next year if no interview is conducted
in the first half of the next year. Although this reasoning applies more to child care provided in
daycare centers, I use the same imputation rule for child care provided by nannies.
Aggregate Statistics Prior to 1995, the GSOEP questionnaire only covered enrollment in child
care whereas from 1995 onwards a distinction between daycare centers and nannies was made.
In particular, between 1995 and 1999 the distinction between daycare centers and nannies was
exclusive and from 2000 onwards non-exclusive. Furthermore, for care provided by nannies from
2004 onwards part- and full-time can not be distinguished anymore. In the analysis in the main text
the following two variables are used. Child care enrollment comprising subsidized (daycare centers)
and non-subsidized (nannies) child care for all years which can be part- or full-time, and from the
year 1995 onwards the fraction of children enrolled in non-subsidized child care (nannies) from all
children enrolled in child care (daycare centers and/or nannies). This latter variable assumes that
the relative usage of care provided by nannies prior to 1995 was the same as the average of the
years 1995 to 2007. This strategy is only feasible because for the calibration exercise only aggregate
moments are used but no individual observations.
A.3 Subsidized Child Care Slot Provision
The slot provision rates are calculated from the data provided by the German Statistical Office
(Statistik der Jugendhilfe, various years). They are only available for every fourth year between
1986 and 2002. Table A.3 shows the annual averages over the years 1983 to 2006, for which the
monthly labor supply status from the GSOEP is used. These averages are constructed for the two
age groups zero to two, and three to six and a half as follows: Years before the earliest observation
of the slot provision rates, i.e. 1983 to 1985, will be assigned the same value as the first observation
of the slot provision rate (1986). Similarly, years after the last observation, i.e. 2003 to 2006, will
be assigned the same value as the last observation (2002). For the years between two observations
the mean of the corresponding two observations will be used. The overall provision rates are
then obtained as the mean over all years. From 1994 onwards the provision rates can be further
distinguished by part- and full-time from which the fraction of full-time slots from all slots, the full-
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time share, will be calculated. As for the overall provision rate, the full-time share before the first
and after the last observed data points are extrapolated and between two observation interpolated.
The annual provision rate of part- and full-time slots is then given by the provision rate of slots
times the fraction of part- or full-time slots from all slots. The mean over all these years then
finally gives the average provision rate of part- and full-time slots.
These latter rates are used to construct the success probabilities for the slot lottery. If a female
would have only one draw from the slot lottery at age zero and age three, the provision rates could
be immediately used as model input. There is however no way to determine how often mothers
apply for a slot within a period which is regarded as a unified entity in the model. I therefore
transform the observed provision rates into period equivalents in the following way: As already
described for the imputation of the child care status, the majority of entries into daycare centers
happens once a year. In addition, new information on the child care enrollment status is usually
only once a year available. I assume that in each year a female can draw once from the lottery and
a successful draw implies that the slot is open for the remainder of the period, i.e. until age three
is reached or the child enters school. Once a full-time slot is drawn, the female does not have to
redraw until the end of the period. Drawing a part-time slot implies that the female can redraw
but success is then defined only as drawing a full-time slot because she already has access to a
part-time slot for the rest of the period. Since a model period corresponds to three years I assume
that within a period there is a maximum of three draws which leads to the set of possible access
histories displayed in the left panel of Table A.2.
Table A.2: Access to Subsidized Child Care
Access in Year Period Access History
1 2 3 Mean Status Probability
No No No 0 No (1− PP − PF )
3
No No Part 1/6 No (1− PP − PF )
2PP
No No Full 1/3 Part (1− PP − PF )
2PF
No Part Part 1/3 Part (1− PP − PF )PP (1− PF )
No Part Full 1/2 Part (1− PP − PF )PPPF
No Full Full 2/3 Part (1− PP − PF )PF
Part Part Part 1/2 Part PP (1− PF )
2
Part Part Full 2/3 Part PP (1− PF )PF
Part Full Full 5/6 Full PPPF
Full Full Full 1 Full PF
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Table A.3: Average Annual and Period Provision Rates of Subsidized Child Care Slots
Ages 0 to 2 Ages 3 to 6.5
Annual Period Annual Period
Part-time 0.5 4.3 62.5 71.5
⇒ ⇒
Full-time 1.7 1.7 14.9 24.2
Consider the case that a female would always use as much subsidized child care as she can get
access to. In line with the definition for period child care enrollment status in each year no slot
is assigned a 0, part- and full-time slots 0.5 and 1. The mean over the whole period - the three
years - is given in column 4 in Table A.2 whereas column 5 corresponds to the associated child
care enrollment status for each possible access history using the same thresholds as before (0.25
and 0.75). Since I assume that a female does not have to use the slot she has drawn access to for
some part of the period or at all, columns 4 and 5 give the period access status as opposed to the
period enrollment status. Column 6 displays the probability of observing a specific access history.
PP and PF are the probabilities of drawing a part- or full-time slot in a given year and correspond
to the observed slot provision rates which differ by age. Finally, the probability for having access to
no, a part- or full-time slot over the whole period, which then corresponds to the period provision
rate, is equal to the sum of the history probabilities that are associated with the respective period
access status. For example, the probability to have no slot as defined by the period access status
would be the sum over the two first histories ([No, No, No], [No, No, Part-time]) and equal
to (1− PP − PF )
3 + (1− PP − PF )
2PP .
Table A.3 presents the annual, i.e. observed, slot provision rates and the period provision rates after
the transformation. E.g. while there are 62.5 part-time and 14.9 full-time slots per 100 children
aged three to six and a half, the probability for a female that she has access to a part-time slot
over the whole period where the child is between age three and six and a half is 71.5% and 24.2%
for a full-time slot. Note that by construction, the period provision rates have to be larger than
the annual/observed provision rates. This is also the case for children aged zero to two for the
non-rounded numbers.
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B Model Appendix
Table B.1 shows in column one the fraction of females living within a certain distance to the
children’s grandparents, i.e. the female’s or husband’s parents. Columns two and three display the
corresponding maternal labor force participation and child care enrollment rates for each category.
This information is only available in the years 1991, 1996 and 2001 and has been matched with the
corresponding period labor force participation and child care enrollment status. The last category
(“Farther away”) also includes females without any own parent or parent in law.
Table B.1: Minimum Distance to the Children’s Grandparents
Fraction Participation Enrollment
Ages 0 to 2
Same house 13.1 32.4 1.8
[10.9 ; 15.4] [23.7 ; 41.2] [0.0 ; 4.3]
Same neigbourhood 19.8 38.9 7.8
[17.1 ; 22.4] [31.5 ; 46.3] [3.7 ; 11.9]
Same city 21.8 29.3 6.5
[19.0 ; 24.6] [22.8 ; 35.9] [2.9 ; 10.1]
Within 1h driving distance 25.1 30.7 5.2
[22.2 ; 28.0] [24.4 ; 36.9] [2.2 ; 8.2]
Farther away 20.2 29.2 5.8
[17.5 ; 22.9] [22.4 ; 36.1] [2.3 ; 9.4]
Ages 3 to 6.5
Same house 11.7 63.0 89.1
[9.5 ; 14.0] [53.1 ; 73.0] [82.7 ; 95.5]
Same neigbourhood 19.5 66.0 90.8
[16.7 ; 22.2] [58.5 ; 73.5] [86.3 ; 95.4]
Same city 21.2 58.1 87.4
[18.4 ; 24.1] [50.6 ; 65.6] [82.4 ; 92.5]
Within 1h driving distance 24.0 61.9 81.5
[21.1 ; 27.0] [55.0 ; 68.8] [75.9 ; 87.0]
Farther away 23.5 51.9 77.8
[20.6 ; 26.5] [44.7 ; 59.1] [71.8 ; 83.8]
Note: 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. The information on distance to
the (children’s) grandparents is only available in the years 1991, 1996 and 2001.
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C Calibration Appendix
C.1 Income
The husband’s income process (Equation (23)) as well as the persistence parameter ρ∗ of the income
shock ǫ∗t (Equation (1)) are estimated directly from the data. I first calculate for each year the total
annual labor income, including side jobs and self-employment, pensions, unemployment benefits (to
capture the full risk of the income process), compensation for further training or education, and any
additional payments as boni, 13th and 14th salary, vacation and Christmas pay received during the
year. I then assign to each month in a year the corresponding monthly average of the corresponding
annual income. Finally, the period income is defined as the sum of these average monthly incomes
over all months in a period.
While for the husbands the earnings equations (23) and (1) can be estimated directly, this is more
difficult for females since a consistent mapping between the measure of experience in the model
and experience in the data is only feasible for females observed prior to their first birth. I therefore
assume that females face the same earnings process as their husbands but take into account that
they are on average 2.9 years younger and introduce a gender gap in mean wages to capture gender
differences in education, occupations and potentially discrimination.
The age difference of nearly three years corresponds approximately to one model period. A female
who has worked full-time in all periods, i.e. x˜t = t−1, should receive the same (deterministic) wage
a male had in the period before because of the age difference. I therefore shift the income process
for husbands by one period to obtain that of females:
ln Yt(x˜t = t− 1) = ln Y
∗
t−1 = η
∗
0 + η
∗
1(t− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜t
− 1) + η∗2(t− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˜t
− 1)2 + ǫt (C.1)
Equation (C.1) can then be reformulated to obtain the coefficients of the female income process:
ln Yt =η
∗
0 − η
∗
1 + η
∗
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
η0
+ [η∗1 − 2η
∗
2 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
η1
x˜t + η
∗
2︸︷︷︸
η2
x˜2t + ǫt (C.2)
This implies that in the model in a given period, where husbands and females by construction have
the same age, females have a lower mean wage and face larger returns to experience than their
spouses if η∗2 < 0. Using the full-time log wages of both sexes prior to the first birth,
23 the gender
wage gap in mean income controlling for age can be estimated and added to the log of the gross
income:
η0 = η
∗
0 − η
∗
1 + η
∗
2 +∆gender. (C.3)
This procedure is similar to the one used by Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2010). The last
missing piece of the income process concerns the stochastic part (Equation (1)) where I follow
Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and use the male estimates for the females. Table C.1
summarizes the estimation results on the income process.
23By then 75% of the females are working full-time.
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Table C.1: Income Process
Estimate
Gender wage gap
∆gender -0.245
Deterministic part
η∗0 / η0 11.647 / 11.343
η∗1 / η1 0.051 / 0.065
η∗2 / η2 -0.007 / -0.007
Stochastic part
ρ∗, ρ 0.882
σε∗ , σε 0.272
Note: Estimation based on incomes in 2008e. η0
is calculated as in Equation (C.3) and η1, η2 as in
Equation (C.2).
C.2 Taxation and Transfers
The tax code is based on the average income taxes over the sample period in 2008 e, which are avail-
able (in nominal terms) for each
year on the website of the German Federal Ministry of Finance
(https://www.abgabenrechner.de/). The tax code consists of three parts separated by two
thresholds. First, annual incomes up to 3282e, the smallest income tax allowance in the years
1983 to 2006, are tax-exempted. Second, every e above 100,000e is taxed linearly at a marginal
rate of 52%. Third, every e between the two thresholds is taxed at an increasing marginal rate. The
coefficients for this part are obtained by regressing the average tax burden over the sample period
on a seventh order polynomial of taxable income, i.e. income less the tax allowance. The upper
threshold of 100,000e was chosen because for higher incomes the average marginal taxes does not
change anymore. Figure C.1 and Table C.3 summarize the information on the progressivity of the
tax code implemented in this paper.
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Table C.2: Monthly Social Security Contributions
Insurance Contribution
Type Rate (%) Limit (e)
Unemployment 3.52 4827.56
Pensions 10.29 4827.56
Health 7.28 3553.62
Long Term Care 0.40 3553.62
Source: German Federal Ministry of Labor and So-
cial Affairs. Figures are averages over the years 1983
to 2006 expressed in 2008 e and represent the em-
ployee’s contributions.
Table C.3: Annual Taxes
Taxable Income Tax Burden
0 - 3282 0
3283 - 100000
∑7
i=1 βi(y − 3282)
i
β1=.07415027
β2=.00001249
β3=-3.990e-10
β4=9.011e-15
β5=-1.143e-19
β6=7.456e-25
β7=-1.964e-30
100001 - ∞
∑7
i=1 βi(1e5− 3282)
i+(y-1e5)×0.52
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, own calculations. Fig-
ures are averages over the years 1983 to 2006 expressed in 2008 e.
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Figure C.1: Annual Tax Burden and Average Tax Rate
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Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, own calculations. Figures are averages over the years 1983 to 2006
expressed in 2008 e.
Table C.4: Child Benefits
Number of Children Benefits
1 93.99
2 210.23
3 379.78
Source: German Federal Ministry of Fi-
nance. Figures are averages over the years
1983 to 2006 expressed in 2008 e.
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C.3 Child Care Fees
Table C.5: Monthly Per Child Fees - Regression Coefficients
Subs. Non-Subs.
Intercept 53.79 236.49
Full-time 50.20 177.52
Ages 0 to 2 21.90 —
Siblings in −29.56 —
subsidized child care
Household income† 0.02 —
Note: The coefficients for subsidized child care are ob-
tained from a Tobit regression from all children in the
selected sample enrolled in subsidized child care with cen-
soring at 0e and at 447.72 e, the lowest and highest ob-
served monthly fee for subsidized child care. Due to the
low usage of non-subsidized child care the coefficients for
non-subsidized care are obtained from all children in the
GSOEP in non-subsidized child care by an OLS regression.
The information about fees that also allows to distinguish
between subsidized and non-subsidized child care is only
available in the years 1996, 2002 and 2005 and were trans-
formed into 2008e.
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Table C.6: Monthly Per Child Fees - Predicted Values
Subs. Non-Subs.
Baseline fee
Part-time 63 236
Ages 3 to 6.5
No siblings
Median household income†
Extra Charges
Full-time (+) 46 177
Ages 0 to 2 (+) 19 —
Siblings in subsidized child care
One further (–) 27 —
Two further (–) 45 —
Household income is (+) 30 —
twice the median
Note: The fees are expressed in 2008e and are predicted
values from the regressions reported in Table C.5.
† The median household income in the sample with chil-
dren in subsidized child care amounts to 4583e per month
and is further deflated by the OECD (Oxford) equivalence
scale to account for household size. A two parent, one child
household is assumed for the baseline fees and in case of
the sibling discount two and three children are used for the
application of the equivalence scale.
Non-subsidized child care is estimated to be three
to four times as expensive as subsidized child
care.This estimate seems very plausible as around
75% of the operating expenses per subsidized
child care slot are covered by the subsidy, see
Kolvenbach, Haustein, Krieger, Seewald, and Weber
(2004).
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D Model Evaluation Appendix
In this section I discuss a set of non-targeted moments which were were only touched on in the
presentation of stylized facts in Section 3.
The left panel of Figure D.1 shows that the part-time maternal labor force participation rate is
predicted very well also for the non-targeted periods three to five. In contrast, the full-time maternal
labor force participation rate in the data increases during periods three to four but decreases slightly
in the model. This can be explained by the dominance of the participation-decreasing effect of the
increasing husbands’ income (see Figure 7) over the participation-increasing effect of the decreasing
utility from spending time with the children. In the fifth period the latter effect dominates the
former such that the full-time maternal labor force participation rate in the model increases and is
very close to the data.
Figure D.1: Model Fit - Part- vs. Full-time Rates
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Recall that the average part- and full-time maternal labor force participation rate in periods one,
two and six were used as targets. Figure D.2 documents the part- and full-time maternal labor
force participation rates broken down by the number of children. The just described behavior of
the full-time labor force participation rates during periods three to five is common to all parities.
For females with one child part-time labor force participation is too high relative to the data,
particularly once children enter school, whereas the opposite is true for the full-time labor force
participation rate. For females with two children, which represent more than half of all females
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Figure D.2: Model Fit - Part- vs. Full-time Rates by the Number of Children
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and all mothers in the sample, both labor force participation rates are predicted fairly well and fall
within the 95% confidence intervals. For females with three children both rates in the model are
lower than the actual ones with the exception of the full-time labor force participation rate in the
first two periods. The part- and full-time child care enrollment rates by the number of children are
matched precisely. Although for mothers with one child the part-time child care enrollment rates
are not within the 95% confidence intervals, the qualitative facts, i.e. a low (high) part-time child
care enrollment rate for children aged zero to two (three to six and a half), are predicted correctly
by the model.
The overprediction of part-time labor force participation of mothers with one child and the under-
prediction of labor force participation of mothers with three children is linked to the fertility choice.
Differences in fertility outcomes stem from the heterogeneity of the initial productivity/income
shocks of both spouses, see Figure D.3. Note that the probability of observing a certain combi-
nation of initial income shocks is not equally distributed but concentrated (symmetrically) around
the center of the graph. Generally, fertility is increasing in the initial income shock of one spouse
holding fixed the other spouse’s initial income shock.24 Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2001)
discuss the fertility-income relationship for various models. Similar to the result presented here,
they show that in a static model with child care as a substitute for maternal time, fertility is in-
creasing in household income. This relationship is responsible for the differences in the labor force
participation rates between the model and data for females with one and three children. The former
are on average (due to the persistence of the shock) of lower productivity types and therefore rather
work part- than full-time. This force is stronger than the relatively low incomes of their husbands
which in principle would provide an incentive for more females with one child to work full-time.
The combination of low productivity females and husbands also explains the low part-time child
care enrollment rate in the model relative to the data. Some of these females prefer to incur the
utility loss of using non-paid child care over the consumption loss of using paid child care. In
contrast, females with three children have a lower incentive to work part- and full-time because
their husbands have a higher initial productivity (which is persistent over time) and thus a higher
income on average, see Figure D.3. Only in the first two periods, where the husbands’ incomes are
relatively low (compared to later in life), more females with three children are working full-time in
the model relatively to the data because they are themselves of a high productivity type.
Given the structure of the model employed in this paper, a direct comparison between the fertility-
income relationship in the data and the model is not possible. As an approximation Table D.1
shows the coefficients from an OLS regression of the total number of children on an intercept and
education dummies for the female and the husband. In the data, high education is defined as having
at least a vocational degree plus the permission to attend college (Fachhochschule/Universita¨t) or
a college degree. In the model, high education is defined as having an above mean initial income
shock and in the regression each spousal productivity combination is weighted according to the
stationary distribution. The intercept in the model regression of 0.95 reflects the large fraction of
low educated couples with zero children, compare Figure D.3.25 In the data, low income couples
24Three exceptions break this monotonicity. In contrast to their “neighbors”, couples with the lowest initial
productivity shock combination choose three children because their income is that low that the income gain through
the child benefits outweighs the decrease in the female’s consumption share through the presence of the children. The
two other exceptions stem from the interaction of the non-linear child care fees and benefits with the child-dependent
equivalence scale in the budget constraint.
25Note that the couples with the lowest initial productivity shock combination (who have three children) only
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Figure D.3: Fertility and Income in the Model
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have on average much more children which is reflected by the higher intercept (1.63). While the
size of the education effects is not matched, the model replicates that the husband’s education is a
stronger predictor for fertility than the female’s education by a similar magnitude in absolute terms
(0.200.12 = 1.7 vs.
1.07
0.59 = 1.8). However, in the model also the female’s education raises the number of
children while there is no statistically significant effect in the data.
enter with a weight of 0.000015%.
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Table D.1: Fertility and Income in the Data and the Model
Data Model
Intercept 1.63∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
High Educated Female −0.12 0.59∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
High Educated Husband 0.20∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
Note: Standard errors are give in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indi-
cate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. In the regression for
the model the stationary distribution was used for weighting.
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